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Grupo Fasma v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of the State of NV, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (Apr. 21, 
2016)1 
 




Merely because service of process complies with the Hague Convention does not necessarily 
mean that it complies with constitutional Due Process. Here, the district court failed to conduct 
adequate fact-finding necessary to determine whether service of process complied with 
constitutional Due Process. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of prohibition instructing the 
district court to vacate its order denying Grupo’s motion to quash so that an evidentiary hearing 




In this matter, B.E. Uno, LLC (“Uno”) owned a shopping center in Las Vegas, NV. Famsa, Inc. 
(“Famsa”) leased commercial retail space at the shopping center. Petitioner Grupo Famsa 
(“Grupo”), a publicly traded Mexican company, guaranteed the Famsa lease. Famsa failed to 
comply with the lease and Uno filed a complaint against both Famsa and Grupo in district court 
for breach of the lease and the guaranty.  
 
Because both the United States and Mexico are signatories to the Hague Convention, Uno served 
Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention. These procedures include 
designating a “Central Authority” in the country of service who will then serve the defendant 
according to its own local laws. Here, the Mexican Central Authority issued service upon a 
woman named Claudia Palomo Martinez stating that she was an employee in Grupo’s legal 
department. Grupo filed a motion to quash service, stating that Martinez is a hostess employed to 
greet customers.  
 
Grupo argued that because Martinez is not an agent, officer, or representative of Grupo, service 
of process was constitutionally deficient. Uno argued that service complied with both Mexican 
law and the Hague Convention. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash stating that 
Grupo was properly served under Mexican law and the Hague Convention, and that service 




Grupo argued that service of process was constitutionally deficient because Martinez was not an 
agent, officer, or representative so integrated within Grupo. Uno counter argued that American 
Due Process was incorporated into the Hague Convention, and thus, satisfying the requirements 
of the Hague Convention satisfied constitutional Due Process. The Nevada Supreme Court 
rejected Uno’s argument but also rejected Grupo's standard for what constitutes constitutional 
service of process. 
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Due Process requires notice that is reasonably calculated “to apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”2 Thus, while 
it is relevant whether a person receiving process for Grupo is an agent, officer, or representative 
of Grupo, it is only useful in determining whether notice was reasonable calculated to inform 
Grupo of the pendency of action. Thus, Martinez need not have been an agent, officer, or 
representative, if service was reasonably calculated to inform Grupo of the action. 
Additionally, a certificate of compliance by a foreign nation’s central authority does not 
necessarily satisfy constitutional Due Process. Merely because the Hague Convention applies, 
does not necessitate that a constitutional inquiry is inappropriate or unnecessary. The Court 
further acknowledged that many jurisdictions have held that whether service complies with the 
Constitution is a separate question from whether service complies with the Hague Convention.  
Therefore, the Court holds that where the Hague Convention applies, service of process must 
comply with both the Constitution and the Hague Convention. Thus, while Uno may have abided 
by the service procedures of the Hague Convention, the Mexican Central Authority’s service 
efforts may have been constitutionally insufficient. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is 
appropriate to determine whether Uno’s service was reasonably calculated to apprise Grupo of 
the pendency of the action. 
Conclusion  
 
A certificate of compliance from a foreign nation’s central authority does not guarantee 
compliance with constitutional Due Process. Here, the district court failed to conduct necessary 
fact-finding to determine whether service of process complied with constitutional Due Process 
requirements. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of prohibition instructing the district court to 
vacate its order denying Grupo’s motion to quash service of process so that an evidentiary 
hearing may be held on the matter.  
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